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 THE UNSECURED CREDITOR'S BARGAIN: A REPLY
 Susan Block-Lieb*
 INTRODUCTION
 U UNLIKE Law and Economics scholars who view secured lend-
 ing as a consensual relationship benefiting not only debtors
 and their secured parties but also the debtors' unsecured creditors,
 Lynn LoPucki describes secured transactions as a subsidy because
 they benefit debtors and their secured creditors at the expense of
 unsecured creditors. He believes security "is an institution in need
 of basic reform" because it "tends to misallocate resources by
 imposing on unsecured creditors a bargain to which many, if not
 most, of them have given no meaningful consent."' He divides
 these unsecured creditors into two groups: involuntary creditors,
 and uninformed creditors who underestimate the risk of unsecured
 status.2 He proposes, first, that secured creditors should be
 subordinated to involuntary creditors,3 and, second, that voluntary
 unsecured creditors should be bound to the terms of their debtor's
 security agreement "only if and to the extent that a reasonable per-
 son in the position of the unsecured creditor would have expected
 to be bound at the time that person extended credit."4
 LoPucki's reformulation of the unsecured creditor's bargain is a
 provocative critique of the economic theory of secured and
 unsecured lending. I am troubled by LoPucki's suggested reforms,
 however. Except for his proposal to modernize the Article 9 filing
 system -a proposal I commend-I question whether LoPucki's
 reforms are likely to be more harmful than helpful.
 * Professor of Law, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A. and J.D., University of
 Michigan. Many thanks to Jim Bowers, David Carlson, Neil Cohen, Steve Knippenberg,
 Peter Lieb, Lynn LoPucki, Cathy McCauliff, Marc Poirier, Charlie Sullivan, and Mike
 Zimmer for their comments on prior drafts.
 1 Lynn M. LoPucki, The Unsecured Creditor's Bargain, 80 Va. L. Rev. 1887, 1891
 (1994).
 2 See id.
 3 Id. at 1902.
 4 Id. at 1947-48.
 5 LoPucki's proposal to modernize the Article 9 filing system incorporates reforms he
 suggested in an earlier article. See Lynn M. LoPucki, Computerization of the Article 9
 1989
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 I. INVOLUNTARY CREDITORS
 LoPucki begins by noting empirical evidence that "a substantial
 portion of all unsecured creditors do not consent to their status in
 any meaningful sense."6 By introducing involuntary creditors to
 the paradigm, LoPucki rightly questions the relevance of a con-
 sent-based theory of secured credit. If the model depends upon an
 assumption that unsecured creditors consent-either explicitly or
 impliedly-to the existence of secured credit, then the existence of
 involuntary creditors in substantial numbers renders the model sus-
 pect. In addition to noting that many unsecured creditors lend
 involuntarily, LoPucki also contends that involuntary creditors-
 particularly tort creditors-can be rendered worse off by their
 debtor's grant of a security interest.7 "Simply by entering into a
 security agreement, the debtor and a favored creditor can expro-
 priate for themselves value that, absent the agreement, would go to
 [tort and other] involuntary creditors."8
 Filing System: Thoughts on Building the Electronic Highway, Law & Contemp. Probs.,
 Summer 1992, at 5, 15-31.
 6 LoPucki, supra note 1, at 1896. He points to Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook's study
 of consumer bankruptcies, which found that "twenty-three percent of the unsecured debt
 of persons filing bankruptcy under Chapters 7 and 13 of the Bankruptcy Code was owed to
 what the researchers called 'reluctant creditors.' " Id. (citing Teresa A. Sullivan, Elizabeth
 Warren & Jay L. Westbrook, As We Forgive Our Debtors 18, 294 (1989)). This statistic
 may be irrelevant if, as I suspect, LoPucki's reform is primarily directed toward corporate
 tortfeasors and their secured creditors. See infra notes 21-23 and accompanying text.
 Moreover, although these data refer to a wide variety of involuntary creditors-taxing
 authorities, other governmental entities, utilities, health care providers, and ex-spouses and
 children with unpaid support orders-LoPucki often limits his analysis to tort creditors
 (although his proposal would apply to all involuntary creditors). See LoPucki, supra note
 1, at 1896-1916. His limitation is understandable, because his criticisms are less apt as
 applied to nontort involuntary creditors, a point discussed more fully below. LoPucki goes
 on to "speculate that money owed to reluctant creditors constitutes an even larger portion
 of the debt of financially distressed companies." Id. at 1896. Whether this speculation is
 empirically justified is difficult for me to gauge, so I will accept it as true.
 7 Id. at 1897-98.
 8 Id. For other discussions of the incentive to externalize tort risk, see Henry Hansmann
 & Reinier Kraakman, Toward Unlimited Shareholder Liability for Corporate Torts, 100
 Yale L.J. 1879 (1991); David W. Leebron, Limited Liability, Tort Victims, and Creditors, 91
 Colum. L. Rev. 1565 (1991); Steven Shavell, The Judgment Proof Problem, 6 Int'l Rev. L.
 & Econ. 45 (1986); [hereinafter Shavell, Judgment Proof]; Steven Shavell, Liability for
 Harm Versus Regulation of Safety, 13 J. Legal Stud. 357 (1984) [hereinafter Shavell,
 Liability vs. Regulation]; Robert B. Thompson, Unpacking Limited Liability: Direct and
 Vicarious Liability of Corporate Participants for Torts of the Enterprise, 47 Vand. L. Rev. 1
 (1994); Christopher M.E. Painter, Note, Tort Creditor Priority in the Secured Credit
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 LoPucki concludes that the exploitation of involuntary creditors
 should be eliminated by subordinating secured creditors to invol-
 untary creditors,9 conceding that this proposal would "drastically
 change the American legal system."'0 Subordination of secured
 debt to involuntary debt would drastically alter the law of secured
 transactions, but drastic reform would be justified only if it were
 the most effective means of internalizing the risk of accidents, and
 if the benefits of internalizing this risk would outweigh the detri-
 mental effects that basic reform of Article 9 might have upon the
 available credit pool. LoPucki has shown neither.
 A. Are Secured Creditors the Second-Best Cost Avoiders?
 LoPucki's argument builds on an economic analysis of the law of
 tort. Tort liability rules-whether rules of negligence or strict lia-
 bility-can be viewed as efficient to the extent that they create
 System: Asbestos Times, the Worst of Times, 36 Stan. L. Rev. 1045 (1984). The phrase
 "externalization of tort risk" is Leebron's. Leebron, supra, at 1648.
 For discussions of the incentives to externalize the risk of other involuntary claims, such
 as environmental liability and liability for underfunded pension plans, see, e.g., Michael D.
 Green, Successors and CERCLA: The Imperfect Analogy to Products Liability and an
 Alternative Proposal, 87 Nw. U. L. Rev. 897 (1993); Kathryn R. Heidt, Cleaning Up Your
 Act: Efficiency Considerations in the Battle for the Debtor's Assets in Toxic Waste
 Bankruptcies, 40 Rutgers L. Rev. 819 (1988) [hereinafter Heidt, Cleaning Up Your Act];
 Kathryn R. Heidt, Liability of Shareholders Under the Comprehensive Environmental
 Response Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA), 52 Ohio St. L.J. 133, 172-73 &
 n.280 (1991) [hereinafter Heidt, Shareholder Liability]; Howell E. Jackson, The Expanding
 Obligations of Financial Holding Companies, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 507 (1994).
 9 See LoPucki, supra note 1, at 1902, 1907-16. LoPucki's proposal is therefore distinct
 from the reforms proposed by other commentators. Shavell suggests mandatory insurance
 and other regulations to offset the incentive to externalize tort risk. See Shavell, Judgment
 Proof, supra note 8, at 53-55 (suggesting mandatory universal insurance); Shavell, Liability
 vs. Regulation, supra note 8 (suggesting regulation in defined circumstances). Hansmann
 and Kraakman instead propose abolition of the corporate rule of limited liability. See
 Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 8, at 1880. Other scholars would alter, but not
 abolish, the rule of limited liability. For example, Howell Jackson contends that enhanced
 liabilities should be imposed on financial holding companies. Jackson, supra note 8, at 513,
 612-14. Heidt contends that environmental liability should be assessed against
 shareholders of the corporate "dumper" when the shareholder could have prevented the
 "dumping." Heidt, Shareholder Liability, supra note 8, at 172-73 & n.280. In another
 article, Heidt contends that the government should be allowed to recover environmental
 cleanup costs out of a corporate "dumper's" assets before secured creditors are allowed
 access to them-although she apparently recommends that these remedies against the
 secured creditors be cumulative, rather than exclusive, of remedies against shareholders.
 See Heidt, Cleaning Up Your Act, supra note 8, at 839-41.
 10 LoPucki, supra note 1, at 1916.
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 incentives for actors to minimize the cost of accidents.'1 Imposing
 liability upon a tortfeasor can be viewed as efficient if the
 tortfeasor, rather than the tort victim, is the best cost avoider-the
 party best able to determine and implement the efficient level of
 care12 and the efficient level of activity.13 An insolvent tortfeasor
 cannot be the best cost avoider, however. To the extent that a tort
 judgment exceeds the value of the tortfeasor's assets, liability does
 not create an incentive to avoid the accident by incurring preven-
 tive measures.'4 The question then becomes which party, among
 various third parties, is the second-best cost avoider.
 By proposing to subordinate secured debt to involuntary debt,
 LoPucki must believe that secured lenders are the second-best
 avoiders of their debtors' accident costs. In contending that revo-
 lutionary change of Article 9 is justified because alternatives-sub-
 ordination of involuntary debt to secured debt15 and mandatory
 universal insurance16 are or would be ineffective, LoPucki
 impliedly asserts that secured lenders are better cost avoiders than
 their debtors, the debtor's victims, and the debtor's insurers.
 LoPucki does not examine other important second-best cost
 11 See, e.g., Guido Calabresi, The Costs of Accidents: A Legal and Economic Analysis
 26 (1970) ("I take it as axiomatic that the principal function of accident law is to reduce the
 sum of the costs of accidents and the costs of avoiding accidents."). It is important to be
 precise about the costs sought to be avoided. In the case of tort and environmental
 liabilities, one such cost is the cost of accidents. Moreover, Calabresi distinguishes
 between primary, secondary, and tertiary accident costs. See id. at 26-28 (defining
 "primary" accident costs as those related to the "reduction of the number and severity of
 accidents," "secondary" accident costs as those concerned with "reducing the societal costs
 resulting from accidents," and "tertiary" accident costs as involving "the costs of
 administering our treatment of accidents"). Another cost is the risk that the tortfeasor will
 be judgment proof-insolvency costs. In the case of pension liabilities, there are no
 accident costs-only insolvency costs-because there is no accident to avoid other than the
 insolvency, or underfunding, of the defined-benefit pension plan.
 12 See id. at 135 ("A pure market approach to primary accident cost avoidance would
 require allocation of accident costs to those acts or activities (or combinations of them)
 which could avoid the accident costs most cheaply.").
 13 See Steven Shavell, Strict Liability Versus Negligence, 9 J. Legal Stud. 1, 2-3 (1980).
 14 Shavell, Judgment Proof, supra note 8, at 45. However, Shavell posits that the
 "judgment proof problem" he identifies "is less pronounced under the negligence rule than
 under strict liability" because "taking proper care allows injurers to escape liability entirely
 under the negligence rule, whereas it merely lowers the likelihood of liability under strict
 liability." Id.
 15 LoPucki, supra note 1, at 1903-06.
 16 Id. at 1906-07. LoPucki does not articulate whether this universal scheme would
 mandate first-party or liability insurance, but his criticisms apply to either sort of system.
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 avoiders, however. He seems to view lenders as better cost
 avoiders than their debtors' shareholders but does not delve very
 deeply into this question, because he sees[] no reason to choose
 between the two reforms."'7 He also does not consider whether
 there are circumstances in which the government would be a better
 cost avoider than a secured lender.
 Identification of the second-best cost avoider is not only neces-
 sary, but also messier than LoPucki admits. My provisional
 thoughts on the topic are that this choice depends on four factors:
 (1) the nature of the involuntary claim, (2) the nature of the
 debtor, (3) the nature of the second-best actor and the cost avoid-
 ance mechanisms available to that actor, and (4) the retroactivity
 of the enhanced liability imposed against the second-best actor.
 1. The Nature of the Involuntary Claim
 Although LoPucki often limits his analysis to tort creditors, the
 logic of his argument applies to all involuntary creditors. The
 breadth of his reformulation of the unsecured creditor's bargain is,
 in part, its strength-when he questions the efficiency of Article 9's
 subordination of involuntary claims to secured claims, he raises a
 sweeping challenge to the Law and Economics model of secured
 transactions.
 The breadth of this challenge is also its weakness, however,
 because the validity of his analysis, and particularly the reform he
 proposes, varies substantially depending upon the type of involun-
 tary claim to which it is applied. LoPucki focuses on tort claims,
 but by innuendo and the occasional footnote raises the possibility
 that his reform should be applied to environmental and pension
 claims as well.18 The notion that secured lenders are the second-
 best cost avoiders of environmental costs and pension costs is dis-
 tinct from the argument that these lenders should be relied upon to
 minimize the costs of other accidents. The single largest distinction
 among tort, environmental, and pension claims that leaps to mind
 is that environmental and pension claims, unlike tort claims, arise
 17 Id. at 1915.
 18 See, e.g., id. at 1896-97 & n.41.
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 in the context of highly detailed regulatory schemes.'9 Adding this
 regulatory dimension to the analysis raises the possibility of the
 government as a second-best cost avoider. Then the question
 arises whether the secured creditors of either a "dumper" of toxic
 waste or the sponsor of a single-employer defined-benefits pension
 plan are better cost avoiders than the government. LoPucki does
 not address this question.20
 2. The Nature of the Debtor
 The tortfeasors LoPucki has in mind must be corporate. When
 noncorporate tortfeasors are instead considered,2' it is unclear that
 the tortfeasor has an incentive to "reduce [its] real exposure to tort
 19 This distinction may follow from happenstance rather than deliberation. Several
 influential scholars argue that, in certain circumstances, regulation may be a better means
 of allocating the risk of tortious injury as well. See, e.g., Shavell, Liability vs. Regulation,
 supra note 8, at 365 (concluding "not only that neither tort liability nor regulation [sh]ould
 uniformly dominate the other as a solution to the problem of controlling risks, but also that
 they should not be viewed as mutually exclusive solutions to it").
 20 Other commentators have. In a series of articles, Kathryn Heidt contends that
 lenders and shareholders are both better cost avoiders than the government because,
 unlike shareholders and lenders, the government does not have access to market
 mechanisms as a means of creating incentives for "dumpers." See Heidt, Cleaning Up
 Your Act, supra note 8, at 839-41 (arguing that "dumper's" secured creditors make better
 environmental cost avoiders than the government); Heidt, Shareholder Liability, supra
 note 8, at 172-73 & n.280 (arguing that shareholders of "dumpers" are better cost avoiders
 than the government).
 By contrast, Howell Jackson, who views a corporate sponsor as a better avoider of its
 pension plan's insolvency costs than creditors and other third parties, contends that the
 best cost avoider of pension liability is clearly the government. See Jackson, supra note 8,
 at 613. He argues that a rule of law that renders plan sponsors liable for pension claims, or
 that subordinates claims of the sponsor's lenders to pension claims, creates incentives for
 the sponsor to internalize insolvency costs, see id. at 612-13, but that these incentives can
 be accomplished more directly through regulation-simply requiring that pension plans be
 fully funded as a condition of their receipt of tax and other benefits, see id. at 613.
 At times, enhanced obligations may also have a role to play as a second-best or
 interim regulatory strategy. Private pension plans, for example, invest the bulk of
 their assets in marketable securities, and traditional capital requirements-in the
 form of strict full-funding rules-would be a simple and efficient way to ensure the
 solvency of private pension plans. Nevertheless, the transitional costs and political
 consequences of imposing a full-funding requirement may make it difficult for
 regulatory authorities to impose full funding obligation in the near term.
 Id. (footnotes omitted).
 21 Even when corporate tortfeasors are considered, however, there are substantial
 disincentives for overleveraging. Not all corporate debtors are risk neutral, and where
 financial markets are imperfect, the choice between debt and equity will matter to a risk-
 averse debtor, even a corporate one. Moreover, reputational concerns may provide
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 liability"22 by granting security interests covering all of its property
 and by rendering itself insolvent.23 Once it is clear that LoPucki is
 referring primarily to corporate tortfeasors, it is also clear that his
 proposed reform-subordination of secured to involuntary debt-
 will be ineffective unless combined with a healthy disrespect for
 corporate form. This is because the subordination of voluntary to
 involuntary debt does not affect a debtor's incentive to incur an all-
 secured-debt capital structure. A debtor's incentive to render itself
 insolvent is inhibited if the debtor's decisionmakers are required to
 bear the costs of this decision. Because the corporate doctrine of
 limited liability insulates even managerial shareholders from insol-
 vency costs, only abolition or restriction of this doctrine would
 affect a corporate tortfeasor's incentive to issue secured debt to
 reduce its real exposure to tort liability.24
 Agreeing that his proposal to subordinate secured to involuntary
 claims is an incomplete solution to the externalization of tort risk,
 LoPucki concludes that tort priority, in combination with share-
 holders' unlimited liability for tort claims, "would seem best to
 serve the goal."25 The question therefore becomes whether the
 secured creditors of a corporate debtor are better cost avoiders
 than its shareholders. LoPucki only briefly considers this issue and
 effective disincentives to corporate tortfeasors if the corporations are subject to various
 disclosure regulations, or when the geographic or industry community is close-knit.
 22 LoPucki, supra note 1, at 1899.
 23 A partnership would have little interest in expropriating assets for the benefit of
 secured creditors, for example, because partners remain liable for the partnership's tort
 liability that exceeds partnership assets. Individuals have more incentive to employ an all-
 secured-debt capital structure to defeat tort claims than partnerships, because they are
 entitled to a discharge from most tort claims in bankruptcy; however, bankruptcy may be
 its own disincentive-more costly to the individual than payment of the tort claim.
 Moreover, reputational concerns are likely to act as a complete disincentive against an
 individual rendering herself insolvent to "reduce [her] real exposure to tort liability." Id.
 24 Even abolition of the corporate doctrine of limited liability would only affect, and not
 ameliorate, the corporation's incentive to render itself insolvent because individual
 shareholders can obtain a discharge of their unlimited liability for the corporation's tort
 claims by filing a bankruptcy petition. See 11 U.S.C. ? 727 (1988).
 25 LoPucki, supra note 1, at 1915. LoPucki states:
 Unlimited liability is an incomplete solution; it would leave the involuntary creditor
 without remedy in the common cases where all shareholders are judgment proof or
 the debtor is unincorporated. Involuntary creditor priority is an incomplete solution
 as well; it would leave the involuntary creditor without remedy in the case where
 tort damages exceed the value of an incorporated debtor's assets.
 Id.
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 concludes that he need not resolve it.26 I disagree that analysis of
 the second-best cost avoider is unnecessary. If enhanced share-
 holder liability creates both disincentives for a tortfeasor to render
 itself insolvent and incentives for preventing accidents, why should
 we also subordinate secured claims to involuntary claims? Even if
 the insurer, its shareholders, and its secured creditors should share
 responsibility for the injurer's involuntary liabilities, there also
 26 See id. Other commentators have explored the issue in greater detail. In the tort
 context, Hansmann and Kraakman considered and rejected a rule that subordinated
 contract creditors to tort creditors, reasoning that shareholders were in a better position
 than contract creditors to internalize the full expense of tort recovery:
 The firm's numerous small creditors will usually be ill-equipped to evaluate tort
 risks: although contract creditors, when deciding on the terms of credit they will
 offer a firm, can judge fairly easily the amount of a firm's assets net of other prior
 contract claims, they might have great difficulty evaluating likely tort claims.
 Similarly, contract creditors will generally have difficulty influencing management's
 policies, and they are unlikely to be better insurers than the firm's shareholders who,
 in large firms at least, can diversify their holdings.
 Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 8, at 1902 n.66.
 Hansmann and Kraakman's proposal to abolish the rule of corporate limited liability has
 engendered its own criticism. See, e.g., Janet C. Alexander, Unlimited Shareholder Liabil-
 ity Through a Procedural Lens, 106 Harv. L. Rev. 387 (1992); Joseph A. Grundfest, The
 Limited Future of Unlimited Liability: A Capital Markets Perspective, 102 Yale L.J. 387
 (1992). These criticisms are also apt as applied to the proposal to accomplish drastic
 reform of Article 9. Unless repeal of Article 9 is uniform among the fifty states, conflicts
 of law and jurisdictional issues would create procedural nightmares. See Alexander, supra,
 at 393-418. Even if uniform repeal were accomplished, evasion of the repeal through con-
 tractual agreements that create the practical equivalent to a security interest would be
 commonplace and difficult to prevent. See Grundfest, supra, at 392-410. If Article 9 were
 repealed, creditors seeking "security" would instead require the debtor to transfer the
 "collateral" to a special purpose finance subsidiary, see LoPucki, supra note 1, at 1914 &
 n.106, or exact a negative pledge agreement from the debtor, see id. at 1926-28, or "lease"
 or "purchase" the same assets, see James J. White, Efficiency Justifications for Personal
 Property Security, 37 Vand. L. Rev. 473, 505-08 (1984).
 In the context of pension claims, Howell Jackson contends that corporate sponsors
 should be held responsible for the insolvency costs of their underfunded single-employer
 defined-benefit pension plans, viewing a sponsor as the practical equivalent of a holding
 company (and thus a shareholder) of the plan. See Jackson, supra note 8, at 540-58, 613.
 Jackson compares enhanced obligations of pension sponsors and other financial holding
 companies to alternative means of minimizing insolvency costs, including subordination of
 secured debt to pension debt. Id. at 598-600. Significantly, he concludes that enhanced
 liabilities are preferable to other third-party penalties because they are more likely to be
 correctly calibrated. Id. at 599 ("By forcing losses from institutional failures back onto the
 holding company, enhanced obligations ensure that the holding company, which by virtue
 of its relationship bears minimal informational costs with respect to the activities and pros-
 pects of its subsidiaries, will factor the possibility of such liability into its decisionmaking
 processes.").
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 should be a system for allocating this liability among the various
 defendants. One obvious allocation is to assign liability first to the
 injurer, next to the second-best cost avoider, and so on. This prior-
 ity scheme of cumulative liability requires a determination of the
 second-best cost avoider. Alternatively, a combination of reforms
 might develop contractually although liability is imposed against a
 single cost avoider. For example, LoPucki notes that "[i]n a tort-
 first world, those secured creditors could be counted on to expand
 those guarantees [from the owners of corporate borrowers] to
 include the secured creditor's losses from tort priority. The effect
 would be to expand the beneficiaries of consensual unlimited cor-
 porate liability to include the tort creditors."27 But in deciding that
 one reform (subordination of secured claims to involuntary claims)
 should be imposed, where another (restriction of the corporate
 doctrine of limited liability) can be left to develop on a case-by-
 case contractual basis, LoPucki is also implicitly asserting that
 secured creditors are better cost avoiders than their debtor's
 shareholders.
 3. The Nature of the Second-Best Actor
 In choosing from an array of second-best actors-either the gov-
 ernment or a shareholder, lender, officer, director, successor,
 insurer, or professional of the tortfeasor-we should be precise
 about how second-best actors could avoid accident and insolvency
 costs, for there are direct and indirect means of cost avoidance.
 Although a growing area of academic discussion,28 the ability of
 second-best actors to minimize costs has not been explicated
 clearly.
 Second-best actors are unable themselves to prevent an accident
 from occurring. They can influence the injurer to take appropriate
 preventive measures,29 however, because they can exert control
 over the injurer in several ways. First, the second-best actor may
 be able to influence the injurer to take cost-justified precautions
 because the second-best actor is in a position both to control or
 otherwise influence the injurer's operational and financial deci-
 27 LoPucki, supra note 1, at 1915-16.
 28 See supra note 8.
 29 The preventive measures referred to here may involve efforts to make the activity less
 risky or efforts to determine the optimal level of an inherently risky activity.
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 sions, and to monitor for compliance.30 Second, that actor may
 simply create incentives for the injurer to prevent the accident. For
 example, a lender or successor to the tortfeasor may obtain cove-
 nants in lending or purchasing agreements that require the
 tortfeasor to take specified operational or financial action as a con-
 dition of the loan or sale, and then monitor for compliance. As
 another example, second-best actors may attempt to influence the
 tortfeasor to avoid accident or insolvency costs through market
 mechanisms such as the purchase price (in the case of shareholders
 or successors of the tortfeasor)31 or the interest rate (in the case of
 lenders).32 Market mechanisms may be an imperfect means of con-
 30 See Jackson, supra note 8, at 513. Jackson states:
 Not only are financial holding companies apt to be more proficient than government
 officials in evaluating institutional behavior, but holding companies also can monitor
 risks at a lower cost than government agencies, because holding companies already
 have substantial information about their regulated subsidiaries as a result of
 ordinary managerial activities.
 Id.; see also Heidt, Shareholder Liability, supra note 8, at 173 n.280 ("[I]f the costs [of
 environmental accidents] are placed upon the shareholders, there is an incentive created
 for shareholders to avoid this improper disposal and place the cost of avoidance on the
 corporation itself-exactly where it should be placed in order to internalize costs.");
 Painter, supra note 8, at 1076 ("[I]f a firm's voluntary creditors are threatened by tort
 claims, they will have an incentive to monitor the manufacturer's potentially tortious
 behavior ....").
 31 See Green, supra note 8, at 906-07. Green states:
 The strongest argument for requiring the successor to assume responsibility was that
 the successor could serve as a conduit to transfer the liability to the predecessor at
 the time of the asset purchase. Thus, the successor, knowing that it would assume
 the predecessor's liability to future claimants, would discount the price paid to the
 predecessor by the estimated amount of the liability assumed.
 Id.; see also Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 8, at 1907 ("If shareholders faced full
 liability for potential tort losses, share prices would incorporate available information
 about the full extent of these possible losses.").
 32 See Heidt, Cleaning Up Your Act, supra note 8, at 839-40. Heidt states:
 If the state were accorded priority for cleanup costs over all other creditors,
 including the secured creditors of a toxic waste dumper, creditors would adjust their
 interest rates to reflect the increased risk of losing their collateral. . . . In a model
 market the increase in the cost of credit will be included in the producers' price and
 ultimately paid by the consumers. The effect is that a portion of the cost of cleanup
 will be internalized through the pricing of credit.
 Id. (footnotes omitted); see also Painter, supra note 8, at 1079 ("[In a world in which tort
 claimants were equal in seniority to secured creditors,] secured creditors ... would have to
 raise their interest rates and engage in increased monitoring because of the increased risks
 of nonpayment they face when more parties are 'in line' before them.").
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 trolling the injurer's actions,33 but may require less monitoring by
 the second-best actor.34
 Any comparison of the government to other second-best actors
 must also recognize that the government faces limited means for
 influencing a tortfeasor's level of care and level of activity: it can
 regulate, it can tax, or it can condition the conferral of some bene-
 fit upon the tortfeasor's satisfaction of some standard. But the
 government generally does not use market mechanisms of price or
 interest rate as a means of creating incentives for tortfeasors to
 internalize the costs of their accidents.35
 Alternatively, second-best actors, of whatever sort, can indirectly
 minimize accident and insolvency costs either by requiring the
 tortfeasor to obtain more complete insurance coverage36 or by
 "self-insuring" for these costs by spreading the risk of their occur-
 rence.37 Risk spreading may occur through the market mecha-
 33 To some extent, the effectiveness of market mechanisms-whether employed by
 shareholders, lenders, or other second-best actors-will depend upon the nature of the
 accident and the tortfeasor. For example, second-best actors may effectively implement
 market mechanisms as applied against entire risky industries-in a tort-first world, shares
 of stock in a dynamite producer should be cheaper than shares of stock in producers of
 cotton balls (and the cost of credit and insurance higher for dynamite manufacturers than
 cotton ball manufacturers). Market mechanisms will be much less accurately applied to
 corporations that manufacture both dynamite and cotton balls simultaneously, however.
 Theoretically, it would be possible for second-best actors to distinguish between
 corporation A and corporation B, both of which manufacture dynamite and cotton balls,
 based on their level of production and precautionary expenditures, and for this
 information to be reflected in the markets for capital, credit, and insurance in which A and
 B compete. In practice, these markets-especially the market for credit-may be
 incapable of incorporating these complex differentiations.
 34 Monitoring would still occur, but of a different sort. Contractual provisions would
 need to be monitored for compliance and enforcement. Price terms need not be enforced
 for continuing accuracy, except as to prospective purchases or extensions of credit.
 35 See, e.g., Heidt, Shareholder Liability, supra note 8, at 172-73 & n.280.
 Environmental law is, of course, the exception to this general rule. See generally
 Symposium, Free Market Environmentalism: The Role of the Market in Environmental
 Protection, 15 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 297 (1992) (discussing the use of market mechanisms
 to internalize the costs of environmental problems).
 36 See Painter, supra note 8, at 1076 ("[I]f a firm's voluntary creditors are threatened by
 tort claims, they will have an incentive to monitor the manufacturer's potentially tortious
 behavior and to force the manufacturer to purchase adequate insurance.").
 37 See Thompson, supra note 8, at 3-4. Thompson states:
 Tort law seeks to create incentives for an enterprise to control risks and to spread
 costs to more efficient risk-bearers. Liability aimed at managers suggests that the
 incentive to control corporate actions is the principal focus of extending liability,
 since corporate managers control an enterprise but may not be efficient risk-bearers.
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 nisms of price and interest rates-by shifting the accident risk
 faced by individual victims, initially, to the injurers' markets for
 capital and debt in the form of a discounted price for equity or
 increased cost of credit, and, eventually, to the injurers' customers
 in the form of increases in the cost of the goods sold or services
 rendered by the injurer.38 Finally, the harsh effects of accident
 costs can be minimized by shifting the risk of accidents from vic-
 tims, who are unlikely to be able to bear the expense, to second-
 best actors, who are likely to be wealthy enough to absorb the
 loss.39 These indirect mechanisms may work independently of any
 effort to create incentives for the tortfeasor to prevent the occur-
 rence of an accident; they also work to minimize secondary acci-
 dent costs by ensuring compensation for victims' loss.
 LoPucki briefly compares secured lenders and shareholders as
 cost avoiders but ends up concluding that neither unlimited liability
 nor tort priority offers a complete solution to the problem because,
 in both instances, uncompensated victims would remain.40 In mak-
 ing this point, LoPucki appears both to focus on lenders' and
 shareholders' comparative abilities to compensate victims and to
 ignore their comparative abilities to influence tortfeasors to pre-
 vent accidents. Both qualities, however, are important to the
 choice of a second-best cost avoider.' Moreover, in comparing the
 deep pockets of secured lenders and shareholders, LoPucki
 neglects to consider the deep pockets of the tortfeasor-he forgets
 that the injurer's assets would also be available for distribution to
 victims. If the corporate doctrine of limited liability were abol-
 Liability directed toward shareholders, particularly in publicly held corporations in
 which investors are numerous and dispersed, suggests an emphasis on distributive
 concerns such as the ability to bear risk.
 Id. (footnotes omitted); see also Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 8, at 1916
 ("[S]hareholder liability should be seen as a standard problem of tort law. Viewed this
 way, the right question is simply: When are a corporation's shareholders cheaper cost
 avoiders and/or cheaper insurers than the persons who may be injured by the corporation's
 activities?").
 38 The decreased price and increased interest rates charged by self-insuring second-best
 actors are therefore analogous to premiums charged by insurers.
 39 See, e.g., Green, supra note 8, at 916-17. Green argues that "unless one is willing to
 advocate imposing obligations on a random entity simply because it is wealthier or better
 able to absorb a loss, the justifications for imposing liabilities on successors qua successors
 are quite empty." Id. at 917.
 40 See LoPucki, supra note 1, at 1915.
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 ished or restricted, then an injurer's incentive to render itself insol-
 vent would diminish.41 In such a world, the choice between
 secured creditors and shareholders no longer would turn on
 whether one is better able than the other to compensate victims.
 The important issue would become whether secured lenders are
 better than shareholders in controlling and monitoring their
 debtor's risky behavior.
 In making these comparisons, we should recognize that these
 actors come in a variety of shapes and sizes and that these distinc-
 tions relate to their abilities to control and monitor, as well as their
 abilities to spread risk and wealth.42 Equity that is publicly held
 and widely dispersed among small holders ("mom and pop" share-
 holders) is unable to control and monitor its publicly traded corpo-
 rate tortfeasor because it has no role in managing it. Yet it may be
 able to create incentives for the tortfeasor to internalize the cost of
 accidents through a market mechanism-the price paid for shares
 of stock. Moreover, publicly held equity is capable of spreading
 the risk of these accident costs through the market.43 For the iden-
 tical reasons that apply to public equityholders, lenders may be
 equally effective second-best cost avoiders-not because they
 enjoy the power to manage the corporate tortfeasor, but because,
 through contractual or market mechanisms, they can create incen-
 tives for their debtor to internalize the risk of tort liability and to
 spread the risk of accident costs.44 By contrast, equity that is pri-
 41 Moreover, as discussed in the text accompanying notes 21-24, subordination of
 secured claims to involuntary claims does not affect a tortfeasor's incentive to render itself
 insolvent.
 42 See Thompson, supra note 8, at 5 (disputing the efficiency of Hansmann and
 Kraakman's proposal to abolish corporate doctrine of limited liability as applied to
 shareholders of publicly held corporate tortfeasor, because "[n]either ability to control nor
 distributive concerns of tort law supports liability for passive shareholders").
 43 Whether equity of a publicly traded corporate tortfeasor that is held in large blocks by
 institutions would be able to control or monitor effectively seems an open question.
 Clearly, even institutionally held public equity does not generally manage its corporation.
 On the other hand, institutional equityholders may have sufficient leverage with their
 corporations to make them effective second-best cost avoiders, much in the same way that
 secured lenders, who have no direct responsibility for management but enjoy substantial
 leverage with their borrower, might be effective second-best cost avoiders.
 44 In theory, this rationale would seem to apply equally to secured and unsecured
 lenders. In practice, secured lenders appear to have better access to information than do
 unsecured creditors. In addition, secured creditors seem better able to control debtor
 conduct through contractual mechanisms than can unsecured lenders only because
This content downloaded from 150.108.60.10 on Thu, 21 Dec 2017 00:01:07 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 2002 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 80:1989
 vately held by individuals, or wholly owned by a corporate parent,
 is likely to be held by persons able to control and monitor their
 privately held corporate tortfeasor by virtue of their power to man-
 age. These managerial equityholders may or may not be adequate
 risk spreaders: individual owners of privately held corporations are
 unlikely on their own to be able to spread risk; holding corpora-
 tions, on the other hand, are likely to be excellent channels for risk
 spreading. LoPucki only touches on these distinctions among vari-
 ous equity- and debt-holders45 when he concludes that both judg-
 ment-proof individual shareholders and undersecured lenders
 would make ineffective second-best cost avoiders.46
 Finally, in choosing a second-best cost avoider, we should recog-
 nize that, despite the numerous distinctions between them, second-
 best actors are extraordinarily similar-they all attempt to cause
 the tortfeasor to minimize the costs of accidents in roughly the
 same way as does an insurer. Insurance seeks to create incentives
 for accident avoidance through the market mechanism of premi-
 ums and to minimize the costs of accidents by spreading their risk
 among the entire market for insurance. Other second-best actors
 attempt to create incentives for accident avoidance through the
 analogous market mechanisms of price and interest rate, as well as
 to minimize these costs by spreading their risk through the market
 for capital and the market for credit. Thus, another issue to con-
 sider in reflecting on the effectiveness of LoPucki's proposal to
 subordinate secured debt to involuntary debt is whether secured
 lenders are better cost avoiders than are insurers.
 LoPucki does address the comparative abilities of secured lend-
 ers and insurers as cost avoiders when he rejects mandatory univer-
 sal insurance as an effective means of accomplishing the
 internalization of tort risk.47 He rejects mandatory universal insur-
 unsecured credit is more often extended informally (without elaborate documentation)
 than secured credit.
 45 Other commentators have analyzed these distinctions in greater depth. See Jackson,
 supra note 8, at 612 (justifying imposition of enhanced liabilities against financial holding
 companies, including corporate sponsors of single-employer defined-benefit pension
 plans); Thompson, supra note 8, at 39-40 (concluding that the corporate doctrine of limited
 liability should persist for passive shareholders but should be abolished as applied to
 corporate parents of tortfeasors).
 46 See LoPucki, supra note 1, at 1915.
 47 See id. at 1906-07.
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 ance largely because he does not believe that the incentive for
 reactive risk created by the existence of liability insurance (some-
 times referred to as a "moral hazard" problem48) can be resolved.49
 But this argument seems inconsistent with his claim that the subor-
 dination of secured debt to tort debt can be justified on efficiency
 grounds. Both insurers and secured lenders are second-best actors
 who, by controlling and monitoring the debtor, create incentives
 for the internalization of accident costs. When insurance creates
 incentives for reactive risk, so too does the subordination of
 secured to tort debt. And insurance creates moral hazard
 problems when it is difficult or impossible for the insurer to control
 and monitor the tortfeasor's preventive expenditures. But if an
 insurer encounters difficulties in controlling and monitoring the
 behavior of its insured, then shareholders, lenders, and other sec-
 ond-best actors are likely to encounter similar problems. For if
 insurers are unable to "link premiums or the conditions under
 which they will honor claims to injurers' precautions,"50 surely
 shareholders and secured creditors are also unable to link the cost
 of credit or the conditions under which they will extend credit to
 debtors' precautions. After all, insurers have more experience in
 combating a moral hazard problem than do others.
 4. The Effect of Time
 Another issue that LoPucki does not address is the retroactivity
 of his proposed reform. Temporal considerations, however, are
 important to the choice among various second-best cost avoiders.51
 48 For a discussion of the "moral hazard" problem, see Leah Wortham, The Economics
 of Classification: The Sound of One Invisible Hand Clapping, 47 Ohio St. L.J. 835, 844-45
 & n.56 (1986).
 49 See LoPucki, supra note 1, at 1915-16.
 50 Shavell, Judgment Proof, supra note 8, at 46.
 51 See Green, supra note 8, at 917, 922. Green argues that "liberal successor liability (or
 indeed any form of successor liability) [cannot] encourage better environmental disposal
 practices, as the great bulk of the hazardous substance disposal activity governed by
 CERCLA has already occurred." See id. at 917 (footnotes omitted). As a result,
 [liberal successor liability can only serve as a conduit if the successor anticipates
 that it will be held liable for obligations of the predecessor, enabling the successor to
 discount the price it pays for the predecessor's assets. Thus, liberal successor
 liability can only operate fairly if it is imposed prospectively-only those successors
 who purchase assets with fair warning of such a rule should be held liable.
 Id. at 922.
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 In a tort-first world, if litigation is pending between the tortfeasor
 and victim, or if a judgment has been rendered in favor of a tort
 victim at the time the tortfeasor seeks to issue publicly traded
 equity or to borrow from a lender, then the shareholder or lender
 can discover the existence of the litigation or the judgment by
 searching public records. It can then condition its purchase or
 financing upon settlement of the claim or payment of the judg-
 ment, or discount the purchase price or interest rate accordingly.
 If, in this world of subordinated secured claims or unlimited liabil-
 ity, the equityholder or lender searches the public records and finds
 nothing, contractual or market mechanisms would still be useful to
 create incentives for the debtor to take cost-justified preventive
 measures.
 Substantial uncertainty would still exist in this tort-first world,
 however. Even if the shareholder or lender obtained contractual
 or market concessions from its debtor, it would still face a signifi-
 cant risk of subordination to unknown tort claims-subordination
 relating to actions of the debtor that occurred before the inception
 of the lending relationship but that do not manifest injury to puta-
 tive tort victims until after the sale or loan is made. Shareholders
 and secured creditors would have no way to influence the debtor's
 actions as relates to these "long-tail" claims; thus, the efficiency of
 the elevation of these tort claims must be justified primarily on
 risk-spreading and other distributional grounds rather than on the
 grounds that elevation creates incentives for the avoidance of the
 accident.52 Even where risk spreading is conceded to be the pri-
 mary efficiency goal, second-best actors may be unaware of the
 need to discount their purchase price or to increase the cost of
 credit to account for tortious conduct that occurred prior to the
 transaction, especially where victims have not yet manifested injury
 52 See id. at 917 (making a similar argument in contending that successors are unlikely
 second-best cost avoiders in the environmental context). Heidt concedes that retroactive
 application of a rule subordinating secured debt to environmental clean-up costs would
 only approximate allocative efficiency because "current and future consumers [would] bear
 the [increased] cost [of credit], not the past consumers who actually benefited from the
 incorrect lower price." Heidt, Cleaning Up Your Act, supra note 8, at 850. I agree with
 Green that any approximation of allocative efficiency would be coincidental. See Green,
 supra note 8, at 917.
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 in any way.53 Nor are these concerns improved by influencing the
 tortfeasor to obtain more complete insurance coverage-if neither
 the shareholder nor the lender can calculate the extent of the
 potential liability, then both can only guess about proper coverage.
 In addition, as uncertainties about potential liability increase,
 insurers may be less likely to offer any coverage at all.54 As to
 long-tail liability,55 shareholders may be slightly better cost
 avoiders than secured creditors-shareholders, as a group, exist
 from the inception of the corporate debtor until its dissolution;
 lenders only acquire a relationship with the debtor at the inception
 of the financing transaction.56 Moreover, the government may be a
 better cost avoider of long-tail harms than either shareholders or
 secured lenders are, because it can spread the risk of this sort of
 harm among all taxpayers.
 B. Side Effects of the Subordination of Secured Debt
 The Kaldor-Hicks efficiency of a shift from the current rule to
 one in which secured debt is subordinated to involuntary debt
 depends upon whether the gains from the shift exceed the losses-
 whether the increased numbers of involuntary creditors paid in full
 are completely offset by an increase in credit costs and a contrac-
 tion of credit availability. I, like prior commentators,57 view this
 comparison as an untestable empirical question.
 53 Moreover, depending upon the point in time at which lenders' secured claims would
 be subordinated to involuntary claims, secured parties might simply accelerate the loan
 and repossess the collateral as soon as the lender becomes aware of the potential tort
 liability but before any litigation is commenced or judgment entered.
 54 See Green, supra note 8, at 928-29 & n.158 (noting difficulties in obtaining
 environmental insurance).
 55 Temporal considerations are especially heightened in the context of environmental
 liability because the injury often does not manifest itself until years after the toxicity
 occurs.
 56 This temporal analysis does not seem to change perceptibly when applied to
 insolvency, rather than accident, costs. In a tort-first world, assessments of the debtor's
 solvency depend not only upon a valuation of the debtor's assets, but also upon a valuation
 of the debtor's liabilities, including putative tort claims.
 57 See Paul M. Shupak, Solving the Puzzle of Secured Transactions, 41 Rutgers L. Rev.
 1067, 1117 (1989) ("The question raised by this line of analysis becomes entirely empirical.
 Data do not exist, nor are they likely to exist, which show that the beneficial effects of debt
 to tort claimants either outweigh or are outweighed by the detrimental effect that results
 from strategic behavior."); Painter, supra note 8, at 1082 (noting impossibility of testing
 contentions that "increased credit costs might be offset by decreased accident costs" and
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 tively through the following simple inequality: W ? W + A - T.58
 Noting that "[t]he right side of the inequality can be greater only if
 A is greater than T," he deduces that "[f]or A to be greater than T
 for the economy as a whole, A must be greater than T for at least
 some person in the economy."59 He asserts that, absent an
 assumption of risk aversion, "[t]he existence of many such people
 seems unlikely. They would all be people who could have
 expanded their activity in the tort-first world, paid the tort liability
 with their added wealth, and had some left over."60 But his conclu-
 sion is dependent upon the assumptions that "transaction costs are
 small"'6' and that secured lenders not only are risk neutral, but also
 possess sufficient information about accident and insolvency costs,
 as well as the ability to control and monitor the tortfeasor.62 These
 assumptions seem especially "false"63 as applied both to liability
 that "interest and insurance rates to firms making dangerous products might be
 prohibitive").
 Recognizing the empirical nature of the question, a student commentator nonetheless
 "suspects" that the gains would exceed the losses because "[e]quity security holders now
 invest in firms that make dangerous products." Id. ("Since the proposal would put
 creditors in the same position that equity holders now occupy relative to tort claimants,
 creditors might well continue to invest, albeit at a higher rate of interest."). Of course,
 equity holders may just as likely be ignorant of the firm's risk of accidents and insolvency.
 The student commentator goes on, however, to note that, even if the losses resulting from
 the reform exceeded its gains, the reform could still be viewed as allocatively efficient
 because "a company that cannot internalize all the costs of its product and remain solvent
 should not continue to exist in the market. Government subsidies could be arranged to
 guarantee production of essential but unprofitable products." Id. (footnote omitted). But
 this assumes that secured creditors can perfectly cause their borrowers to internalize the
 costs of involuntary claims-it assumes that secured creditors will not overshoot the mark
 and increase the cost of credit beyond what is necessary to create incentives to alleviate
 risk. LoPucki makes this same assumption.
 58 LoPucki, supra note 1, at 1911. LoPucki defines W as "the wealth created by
 economic activity that would occur in a world where tort debt comes first," A as "the
 wealth created by activity that would not occur in a world where tort debt comes first but
 would occur in a world where secured debt comes first," and T as "the tort loss that would
 not occur in a world where tort debt comes first but would occur in a world where secured
 debt comes first." Id. at 1910-11.
 59 Id. at 1911.
 60 Id.
 61 Id. at 1902 & n.64.
 62 Assumptions of nearly perfect information and nearly perfect ability to control and
 monitor are implicit in this equation because, where perfection exists (namely, where W =
 W + A - T), A must equal T.
 63 See LoPucki, supra note 1, at 1893 & n.16.
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 that develops over long stretches of time, such as environmental
 liability, and to lenders who do not have the power to manage their
 debtor's operations.
 Moreover, if risk-averse lenders would view a world in which
 secured claims are subordinated to involuntary claims as risky,
 LoPucki suggests that a market in "secured creditor insurance"
 would arise to "transform [the secured creditor's] tort risk into a
 fixed premium, which [the secured creditor] can require its debtor
 to pay in advance."64 He compares this "secured creditor insur-
 ance" to mortgagee title insurance.65 Another analogy may be to
 insurance coverage of a successor for the products liability of a
 predecessor.66 Yet another may be to the "portfolio insurance"
 Hansmann and Kraakman propose in response to critics who claim
 that abolishing the rule of limited liability would harshly affect
 shareholders whose portfolios of equity holdings are insufficiently
 diverse.67
 The secured creditor insurance LoPucki proposes, however, is
 not likely to prevent his reform from being Kaldor-Hicks ineffi-
 cient, because, despite his assertions to the contrary, it will not
 resolve moral hazard problems.68 The example he provides and his
 64 Id. at 1912.
 65 See id.
 66 See Green, supra note 8, at 928-29 (distinguishing successor products liability
 insurance from successor CERCLA liability insurance by arguing that "the uncertainties
 associated with CERCLA liability are so great that insurance coverage for it is severely
 limited" and that "insurance coverage of a successor for the products liability of a
 predecessor is generally available and has become common, partly at the insistence of
 creditors financing asset acquisitions") (footnote omitted); Michael D. Green, Successor
 Liability: The Superiority of Statutory Reform To Protect Products Liability Claimants, 72
 Cornell L. Rev. 17, 55 n.157 (1986) (noting general availability of successor products
 liability insurance).
 67 See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 8, at 1901.
 68 LoPucki contends that "secured creditor insurance," in combination with a rule giving
 tort victims priority over secured debt, has "advantages over universal tort insurance as a
 solution to the tort priority problem." LoPucki, supra note 1, at 1912. Primarily, LoPucki
 views "secured creditor insurance" as preferable to mandatory universal insurance because
 "risk that is reactive when the debtor is the insured would not be reactive when the secured
 creditor is the insured." Id. LoPucki suggests two other advantages, which seem more like
 distinctions than advantages to me:
 Second, secured creditor insurance would not have to be mandatory, because the
 tort victims would not have to depend on it for their recoveries; they could look to
 the collateral. Secured creditors could have the option to insure or assume the risk.
 Third, the insurance would be limited to the amount of the secured debt, so the
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 analogy to mortgagee title insurance disregard his earlier conclu-
 sion that debtors (at least corporate ones) face incentives to adopt
 an all-secured-debt capital structure.69 His argument thus loses all
 force. He posits:
 [C]onsider the risk that the debtor will intentionally infringe on the
 patent of a competitor. This risk is reactive in the sense that if the
 debtor has insurance that protects it against liability for the
 infringement, the debtor's incentives not to infringe are greatly
 reduced. If the policy merely insures the secured creditor against
 loss because of the debtor's infringement and subrogates the pay-
 ing insurer to the secured creditor's rights against the debtor, the
 debtor's incentives not to infringe are hardly reduced at all. If the
 debtor infringes, the insurer will pay the secured creditor and then
 sue the debtor on the secured debt.70
 However, subrogation to the secured creditor's claim against the
 debtor will provide no disincentive to a debtor who has encum-
 bered all its assets to the secured creditor, other contract creditors,
 and involuntary creditors. Secured creditor insurance suffers from
 the same moral hazard problems that beset mandatory universal
 insurance and any other means of insuring or self-insuring against
 accident costs incurred by corporate tortfeasors.71 Only abolition
 of the rule of limited liability, in conjunction with a rule prohibiting
 shareholders from obtaining a discharge from this corporate liabil-
 ity, would completely resolve this reactive risk.72
 Finally, secured creditor insurance is likely to be unavailable in
 precisely those circumstances in which liability insurance is
 unavailable for the lender's borrower: a market for secured credi-
 tor insurance may develop to mitigate the effects of subordination
 of secured claims to products liability claims, but insurers are
 unlikely to offer secured creditor insurance against the subordina-
 tion of secured claims to environmental and other long-tail
 claims.73 This is because, contrary to LoPucki's thought experi-
 potential loss insured against would be both lower and more predictable than the
 debtor's entire potential tort liability.
 Id. at 1912-13 (footnote omitted).
 69 See id. at 1898-99.
 70 Id. at 1912 n.99.
 71 See supra notes 21-24, 47-50 and accompanying text.
 72 See supra notes 21-24 and accompanying text.
 73 See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
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 ment, transactions costs are not small. Where time is considered
 and long-tail involuntary claims included, secured creditors will
 face substantial uncertainty in a tort-first world. Because insurers
 face the same substantial uncertainties, it appears unlikely that a
 market for secured creditor insurance will develop to cover these
 sorts of claims.
 II. UNINFORMED CREDITORS
 LoPucki believes that "[a] grant of security exploits not only
 creditors who are forced into unsecured status but also creditors
 who accept unsecured status on the basis of an underestimation of
 the risk."74 Exploitation of voluntary creditors is said to occur
 when they are uninformed about: (1) the law of Article 9,75 (2) the
 terms on which the secured creditor has lent funds to the debtor,76
 and (3) the secured creditor's intentions to discontinue the lending
 74 LoPucki, supra note 1, at 1916.
 75 What emerges as LoPucki's primary criticism of the law of Article 9, the only "law"
 affected by his proposed reform, is the "law" that "absent a specific provision of Article 9
 to the contrary, any security agreement, no matter how bizarre, unreasonable, or
 unexpected, will bind unsecured creditors, whether they extend credit before or after the
 security agreement is made." Id. at 1948.
 Throughout the article, LoPucki takes potshots at numerous other provisions of Article
 9, but does not end up proposing any particular reform to address these concerns. For
 example, LoPucki describes Article 9 as "notoriously deceptive" and provides three
 examples of its departures from "basic principles of justice": (1) it "employs generally
 what is often referred to as a 'pure race' filing system," id. at 1917, (2) it "ignores the
 common expectation that a seller can recover the property it sells if the buyer does not pay
 for it," id. at 1917-18, and (3) it attempts "to abolish the equitable doctrines by which
 courts have traditionally protected unsecured creditors against the harshest effects of
 security," id. at 1919. He also criticizes Article 9's failure to require secured creditors to
 provide unsecured creditors with needed information, particularly with respect to
 execution sales, an omission he describes as "so obvious and egregious ... that it cannot be
 ascribed to mere negligence on the part of the drafters." Id. at 1944. Other provisions of
 Article 9 that LoPucki criticizes in the footnotes are those permitting a secured creditor to
 prevail as to advances made after later lenders. See id. at 1942 n.206 (criticizing U.C.C.
 ? 9-312(5), (7)); id. at 1944 n.213 (criticizing ? 9-504(4)); id. at 1945 n.216 (criticizing
 ? 9-301(4)).
 76 The sorts of terms that LoPucki criticizes include the following: clauses providing that
 the loan amount is payable "on demand," id. at 1939 n.194, 1950; "blocked account" and
 "lock box" financing arrangements, id. at 1938 n.191; clauses prohibiting a debtor from
 granting other liens, including purchase-money security interests, id. at 1942; and after-
 acquired property clauses permitting lenders to take a floating lien that covers all of the
 debtor's property, id. at 1918 n.121. Presumably, he anticipates that implementation of his
 proposed reform would often result in juries' refusal to enforce these sorts of clauses.
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 relationship. LoPucki concludes that the exploitation of unin-
 formed voluntary creditors should be remedied by binding
 unsecured creditors to the terms of a security agreements "only if
 and to the extent that a reasonable person in the position of the
 unsecured creditor would have expected to be bound at the time
 that person extended credit,"77 and by "moderniz[ing] the Article 9
 filing system to serve the needs of all who are to be bound by the
 terms of the security agreement."78 Except briefly to quibble in the
 footnotes about what LoPucki refers to as his formulation of Bow-
 ers' Law,79 I generally do not question the accuracy or implications
 of LoPucki's recasting of the unsecured creditor's bargain. How-
 ever, I have a great deal of trouble with the first of these two pro-
 posed reforms-specifically, the substitution of a jury's
 77 Id. at 1947-48.
 78 Id. at 1948.
 79 See id. at 1931-33. The Law and Economics model of secured lending posits that
 unsecured lenders are not harmed by the presence (or possibility) of a perfected security
 interest because, cognizant that the security interest substantially increases the risk that the
 debtor's assets will be insufficient to permit repayment of both secured and unsecured
 creditors, they charge a higher rate of interest than secured lenders do. See Thomas H.
 Jackson & Anthony T. Kronman, Secured Financing and Priorities Among Creditors, 88
 Yale L.J. 1143, 1147-49 (1979). In order to demonstrate the efficiency of such a system, this
 model goes on to conclude that a net savings in the cost of credit results for two reasons:
 (1) secured creditors charge far lower rates of interest than unsecured creditors, and (2)
 the aggregate interest savings caused by secured transactions exceeds the aggregate
 increased interest costs caused by unsecured transactions. See F. Stephen Knippenberg,
 Debtor Name Changes and Collateral Transfers Under 9-402(7): Drafting from the
 Outside-In, 52 Mo. L. Rev. 57, 81-83 (1987).
 LoPucki questions this conventional wisdom. He begins by contending that "security
 tends to expand to the liquidation value of the collateral as a debtor sinks into financial
 distress." LoPucki, supra note 1, at 1933. He calls this LoPucki's formulation of Bowers'
 Law. Id. at 1931. He claims that his formulation justifies the conclusion that unsecured
 creditors can never be compensated for the risk they face, even by charging higher rates of
 interest. See id. at 1935 ("It should be apparent that no interest rate could compensate for
 the risk in a world in which unsecured creditors could look only to liquidation value but
 liquidation value was always fully encumbered.").
 If LoPucki is claiming that his formulation establishes that the probability of a debtor's
 balance sheet insolvency is 100%-that unsecured creditors face the certainty of
 nonpayment and not merely an insolvency risk-then he confuses the aggregate with the
 individual. LoPucki's formulation does not show that every debtor falls into financial
 distress, only that if "a debtor sinks into financial distress," "security tends to expand to the
 liquidation value of the collateral." See id. at 1933. But not every debtor "sinks into
 financial distress." Nonetheless, every creditor lending on an unsecured basis is presumed
 either to charge a higher interest rate to reflect the increased insolvency risk created by the
 secured debt or to refuse to lend. See id. at 1935 n.181.
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 determination of a reasonable security agreement for the actual
 security agreement.
 A. LoPucki's Reformulation of the Unsecured Creditor's
 Bargain: Cash-Flow Surfing on a Coral Reef
 LoPucki proposes "an alternative conception of the unsecured
 creditor's bargain that depends neither on a priority against liqui-
 dation value nor on the existence of a coercive collection right."80
 To LoPucki, unsecured creditors lend "against a cash flow that the
 secured creditor can interrupt at its whim"81 -that is, "they expect
 to be paid in the ordinary course of business from the secured credi-
 tor's collateral, particularly the debtor's usually fully encumbered
 bank account."82 He therefore conceives of the unsecured creditor
 as one who "expects to be repaid as the result of a combination of
 nonlegal pressures on the debtor"83 and who "monitors the debtor
 through credit reports and other sources of information and evalu-
 ates the risk that the business will be discontinued."84 Unsecured
 lending "is likely to be short term and restricted to amounts that
 are small in relation to the creditor's portfolio."85
 Interestingly, LoPucki does not explicitly describe this new para-
 digm as proof positive that unsecured creditors are an exploited
 lot, although he comes close. Instead, he states that an important
 implication86 of the cash-flow surfing theory "is that the unsecured
 creditor is dependent on credit reporting."87 This leads him to con-
 clude that the "seemingly neutral scheme of Article 9 discriminates
 80 LoPucki, supra note 1, at 1940-41.
 81 Id. at 1939.
 82 Id. at 1938.
 83 Id. at 1941.
 84 Id.
 85 Id.
 86 LoPucki finds that "[r]econceptualizing the unsecured creditors' bargain as cash-flow
 surfing has several interesting implications." Id. "First, it explains why even sophisticated
 creditors are willing to lend unsecured. They lend because they believe that the debtor has
 both the ability and the motivation to repay its short-term debt." Id. LoPucki also
 suggests that cash-flow surfing "shows the futility of trying to reproduce the unsecured
 creditors' state law entitlements in bankruptcy." Id. at 1945. LoPucki's point may be that
 unsecured creditors' most important entitlements are procedural entitlements, but it could
 just as persuasively be argued that secured creditors' (especially undersecured creditors')
 most important entitlements are also their procedural ones.
 87 Id. at 1943.
This content downloaded from 150.108.60.10 on Thu, 21 Dec 2017 00:01:07 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 2012 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 80:1989
 against unsecured creditors" because the elaborate disclosure man-
 dated by the U.C.C. serves the information needs of secured, but
 not unsecured, creditors.88 He proposes that this filing system be
 modified to require disclosure of "the kinds of information needed
 by unsecured creditors"89 -for instance, "the amount of the earlier
 secured creditor's line of credit and the amount currently drawn
 against the line."90 And, as noted above, I have no quarrel with his
 proposal to "modernize the Article 9 filing system to serve the
 needs of all who are to be bound by the terms of the security
 agreement."91
 It is his proposal to reformulate the unsecured creditor's bargain
 as "an express or implied agreement in fact"92 that I find objection-
 able. By this, LoPucki intends to alter the Article 9 rule binding
 unsecured creditors to every term of the security agreement
 between the debtor and secured party. Instead, he intends to bind
 unsecured creditors to those terms that a jury concludes are what
 reasonable unsecured creditors would have expected to be
 included in the security agreement.93
 In this section of his article, LoPucki has identified an externality
 inherent to secured financing: the terms of the security agreement
 between a secured party and its debtor may harm the debtor's
 unsecured creditors. Moreover, transaction costs may preclude
 voluntary resolution of this externality through bargaining.94
 LoPucki refers to one of these transaction costs when he notes that
 "under current law, unsecured creditors can be bound to security
 agreements the existence of which they cannot discover, even
 through reasonable diligence."95 A fairly standard argument made
 in the Law and Economics literature is to recommend the shift
 from a property rule to a liability rule when transaction costs
 88 Id. at 1944 & n.212.
 89 Id. at 1944.
 90 Id. at 1944 n.212.
 91 Id. at 1948.
 92 Id. Specifically, in this regard, he proposes "that a security agreement should bind an
 unsecured creditor only if and to the extent that a reasonable person in the position of the
 unsecured creditor would have expected to be bound at the time that person extended
 credit." Id. at 1947-48.
 93 Id.
 94 See R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & Econ. 1 (1960).
 95 LoPucki, supra note 1, at 1948.
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 impede the voluntary resolution of externalities that flow from the
 entitlement.96 Viewed from the perspective of this literature,
 LoPucki's suggestion that unsecured creditors be bound only to the
 terms of a security agreement that would have been "reasonable
 for them to have known or anticipated"97 appears justified as a
 shift to a liability rule from a property rule as to which insurmount-
 able transaction costs prevent the internalization of externalities.
 Although a drastic change to the law of secured transactions, this
 reform would be justified if it were the most effective means of
 internalizing the costs of cash-flow surfing, and if the benefits of
 internalization of this risk outweighed the detrimental effects that
 it might have upon the available credit pool. Once again, LoPucki
 has shown neither.
 B. Property Rule vs. Liability Rule vs. Disclosure Rule
 With his choice of liability rule, LoPucki neglects to consider
 alternative means of accomplishing the internalization of the costs
 of cash-flow surfing. First, LoPucki should explain in greater detail
 why an expansive disclosure rule is not a more effective reform
 measure than the jury standard he proposes, especially because he
 admits that his proposed liability rule "would give secured credi-
 tors the incentive to communicate unexpected terms that they wish
 to impose on unsecured creditors."98 Why require a standard
 intended to create incentives for disclosure when the infrastructure
 for implementing mandatory disclosure already exists? Why not
 simply require secured creditors to disclose the terms of their
 security agreements, either publicly through the Article 9 filing sys-
 tem or privately upon request?
 A substantial benefit of a disclosure rule is the certainty it pro-
 vides secured creditors.99 Compliance with these disclosure
 96 See, e.g., Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Malamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules,
 and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 1089 (1972).
 97 See LoPucki, supra note 1, at 1950.
 98 Id.
 99 The uncertainty inherent in LoPucki's proposal is embraced by him as a beneficial
 element of the standard. For example, he notes that in the regime he proposes, "important
 terms buried in a long security agreement might not be considered 'communicated' even if
 the security agreement was recorded in the public records. Terms not even discussed
 between the parties might be considered communicated if they were what both parties
 expected." Id. at 1950-51. He goes on to explain:
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 requirements would insulate the secured creditor from liability to
 creditors who underestimate the risk of their extension of
 unsecured credit. LoPucki contends that a disclosure rule is unnec-
 essarily costly in some instances.100 In many instances, however,
 the law accepts a degree of imprecision when it embraces a prophy-
 lactic rule rather than a factual standard-the imprecision of an
 objective standard often is overlooked as less problematic than
 both the uncertainty created ex ante and the judicial effort
 required ex post by a subjective standard. Where constitutional
 rights or personal liberty is involved, I could easily be persuaded
 that the costs of a prophylactic rule exceed its benefits. In the con-
 text of a commercial dispute concerning the allocation of insol-
 vency costs, however, I view LoPucki's "reasonable expectations"
 standard as more harmful than helpful.
 Disclosure of the terms of a security agreement, however, would
 be an ineffective means of regulating the externalities caused by
 that agreement if unsecured creditors were unable to obtain or
 effectively use the information. The effectiveness of a disclosure
 rule depends upon the workings of the markets for credit and
 credit information. An optimistic view of these markets posits that
 competent unsecured creditors gain access to the information and
 incompetent unsecured creditors freeride.101 LoPucki suggests that
 The essential difference between this proposed rule and current law is that the
 proposed rule would make the expectations of parties an empirical fact to be proven
 at trial by the party who would rely on it. Current law proclaims and enforces what
 the parties are supposed to expect without regard to their actual expectations.
 Id. at 1951 n.237. In other words, secured creditors would be uncertain about the binding
 effect of the terms of their security agreements until the reasonable expectations of
 unsecured creditors were established at a jury trial.
 100 See id. at 1951. LoPucki states:
 In some situations, the amount in issue would be too small to justify the expense of
 communication between secured and unsecured creditors. In such situations, the
 lack of communication would not indicate that either side had acted unreasonably,
 and implied contract doctrine would be indeterminate. That is, the facts would not
 support the inference that either side had agreed to the other's terms, and the rule
 would provide no basis for decision.
 Id.
 101 Cf. Alan Schwartz, Security Interests and Bankruptcy Priorities: A Review of
 Current Theories, 10 J. Legal Stud. 1, 36 (1981). Schwartz argues:
 Plausibly establishing the incompetence of contracting parties, such as ... employees
 and consumers . . ., is hard to do. The incompetence of employees is especially
 problematic when, as often happens, the employees are organized in unions.
 Further, it is not enough to show that some of these parties are uninformed, because
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 this view of the credit market is unrealistic, for "[b]oth the decision
 to grant [unsecured] credit and the terms of credit ordinarily are
 private, making emulation difficult."'02 My current thinking is that
 neither position has it quite right.
 Even if Article 9 required lenders to disclose to unsecured credi-
 tors the terms of their security agreements, substantial transaction
 costs would continue to exist. Negotiations between unsecured
 and secured creditors over these terms are impeded primarily
 because the terms appear in a contract to which the unsecured
 creditors are bound, but to which they are not a party. This prob-
 lem of privity is exacerbated by collective action problems. The
 large number of unsecured creditors, and the likely divergence of
 their varied preferences for terms, also stand as substantial impedi-
 ments to bargaining over terms ex ante. Negotiations can occur ex
 post,'03 but unsecured creditors have little leverage in seeking a
 waiver of a term. As LoPucki notes, pursuit of their state remedies
 may easily be thwarted by the secured lender.10'
 On the other side of the argument, these transaction costs may
 not be insurmountable if spillover effects serve as a sufficient coun-
 terweight. For example, in a world that mandates the disclosure of
 security agreements, unsecured creditors with leverage (such as
 creditors who sell raw materials necessary to the debtor's contin-
 ued operations) could negotiate with their debtor's secured party
 for the removal of objectionable terms from the agreement to the
 benefit of all unsecured creditors.105 Alternatively, the debtor may,
 markets can work well in the face of substantial numbers of uninformed persons.
 The informed employees and consumers in some cases may police the market
 sufficiently to ensure that wages and prices accurately reflect the existence of
 security.
 Id. (footnote omitted).
 102 LoPucki, supra note 1, at 1920.
 103 These negotiations could be either individual (between the secured party and
 individual unsecured creditors) or collective (between the secured party and all the
 unsecured creditors as a group). See Susan Block-Lieb, Fishing in Muddy Waters:
 Clarifying the Common Pool Analogy as Applied to the Standard for Commencement of a
 Bankruptcy Case, 42 Am. U. L. Rev. 337, 351-53 (1993) (describing unsecured creditors'
 cooperative collection remedies as either individual or collective).
 104 See LoPucki, supra note 1, at 1939-40.
 105 Whether the harmful term will be removed from the agreement to the benefit of all
 unsecured creditors, or whether application of the term will be waived to the benefit of the
 competent creditor but not to any other creditor, depends upon the nature of the term and
 the nature of the negotiations. Some terms more closely resemble public goods, and thus
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 at times, represent unsecured creditors' interests in negotiations
 with the secured party to their benefit. The debtor cannot be
 counted on to represent unsecured creditors' interests in these
 negotiations as a matter of legal responsibility, however. At the
 time of these negotiations, the debtor will not stand as a fiduciary
 to its unsecured creditors.'06 The degree of convergence of the
 debtor's and unsecured creditor's interests changes with each dif-
 ferent term. Some terms LoPucki derides as subsidies for secured
 creditors are terms that the debtor also has an interest in oppos-
 ing-such as a term permitting the secured creditor to discontinue
 the lending relationship "on demand." If the secured lender condi-
 tions the loan on the inclusion of this provision,107 however, the
 debtor may, on balance, rationally conclude that it is better off bor-
 rowing the funds with the demand term in the agreement than not
 borrowing at all.108 Other terms-such as a term prohibiting the
 debtor from granting another security interest, including a
 purchase money security interest ("PMSI")-primarily disadvan-
 tage future lenders rather than the debtor, and the debtor might
 rationally disregard the cost such a term imposes on third parties in
 deciding to acquiesce in its inclusion in the agreement.109 I can
 only guess whether the transaction costs are overridden by freer-
 must be removed from the agreement altogether; others more closely resemble private
 goods, and thus can be waived to the exclusive benefit of the competent creditor.
 106 These fiduciary responsibilities arise, if at all, only after the debtor is rendered
 insolvent. Laura Lin, Shift of Fiduciary Duty upon Corporate Insolvency: Proper Scope of
 Directors' Duty to Creditors, 46 Vand. L. Rev. 1485, 1512 (1993) ("Several courts have
 held that once the corporation becomes insolvent, directors owe a fiduciary duty to
 creditors.").
 107 Rather than condition the loan upon inclusion of the term, the secured creditor may
 rationally increase the cost of credit if the debtor does not acquiesce to the term, as the
 term serves to decrease the secured creditor's (and increase the unsecured creditors') risk
 of nonpayment.
 108 Because the rule of limited liability may create for corporate debtors an incentive to
 incur excessive amounts of debt, there can be no assurance that unsecured creditors would
 reach the same conclusion as their debtor.
 109 A negative pledge covenant may impose costs even upon the debtor, but these costs
 are indirect. Specifically, a perfectly informed debtor would note that the existence of a
 term in its security agreement prohibiting it from granting a PMSI in the future increases
 the cost of obtaining goods on credit in the future. See Jackson & Kronman, supra note 79,
 at 1164-78. Perfectly informed suppliers, if forced by this term to lend on an unsecured
 basis, would demand a higher rate of interest than if permitted by the agreement to lend on
 a secured basis. See id. at 1168-71.
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 ider effects in general, and I assume that the balance varies from
 agreement to agreement and from debtor to debtor.
 As either an alternative or a cumulative liability rule, Article 9
 could simply invalidate or regulate the most exploitive security
 terms. For example, LoPucki's critique of negative pledge clauses
 convinces me that a fruitful line of inquiry may be to consider
 whether Article 9 should invalidate anti-lien clauses in security
 agreements that prevent the creation of a PMSI,1"0 rather than
 leave this for juries to determine on a case-by-case basis."' Invali-
 dation may be too harsh a reform for other terms identified by
 LoPucki as exploitive-such as clauses providing that the loan
 amount is payable "on demand," "blocked account" and "lock
 box" financing arrangements, and after-acquired property clauses
 permitting lenders to take a "blanket lien" that covers all of the
 debtor's property-because these terms are either supported by
 valid commercial purposes or so ingrained to lending practices that
 invalidation would lead to an enormous contraction of credit avail-
 ability. Regulation, rather than invalidation, of these sorts of
 clauses may be a more viable, and equally effective, reform. For
 example, demand obligations need not be outlawed to eradicate
 their potential for exploitation; instead, the U.C.C. could restrict a
 lender's ability to terminate a loan at will by implying that termina-
 tion could occur only after reasonable notice, but permitting the
 110 Anti-lien clauses that prohibit the creation of non-PMSIs may be efficient and, if so,
 should not be invalidated. LoPucki notes that many unsecured loan agreements contain
 anti-lien provisions (which in this context are called negative pledge covenants), and that
 the presence of an anti-lien clause in an unsecured loan agreement acts as the practical
 equivalent of a security interest. See LoPucki, supra note 1, at 1926. I do not understand
 him to argue that anti-lien clauses are exploitive when found in unsecured lending
 documents, however, and thus do not believe that they should be invalidated in this
 context.
 111 But see Robert E. Scott, A Relational Theory of Secured Financing, 86 Colum. L.
 Rev. 901, 970 (1986). Scott argues:
 The leverage obtained by holding the debtor's assets hostage [by means of a blanket
 lien in combination with a negative pledge covenant] enables the creditor to
 influence the debtor's decisionmaking, particularly when the relationship is
 threatened by business reversals. Without a system of security, some projects of
 positive present value will not be pursued and others will be inadequately
 developed.
 Id.; see also F.H. Buckley, The Bankruptcy Priority Puzzle, 72 Va. L. Rev. 1393, 1460-70
 (1986) (criticizing mandatory restrictions on secured lending, specifically the superpriority
 rights granted to holders in due course and to PMSI holders).
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 parties (within limits) to specify the notice period in the security
 agreement."12
 It may be folly to presume that a bright-line rule can be drafted
 to prohibit or regulate every circumstance in which uninformed
 unsecured creditors subsidize secured creditors. Perhaps the better
 reform is to adopt a more open-ended standard, analogous to the
 doctrine of unconscionability.1"3 Incorporation of this sort of open-
 ended standard to secured transactions would be more objectiona-
 ble to the finance industry than invalidation or regulation of spe-
 cific contractual terms. Because open ended, the standard would
 permit uncertainty to creep into the lending relationship and, as a
 result, might increase the cost of credit. The unconscionability of
 terms in a security agreement, however, would be a question for a
 judge, not a jury, to decide."14 And courts would be guided by pre-
 cedent decided under Article 2's doctrine of unconscionability,
 rather than be asked to formulate an entirely new standard per-
 taining to the expectations of a reasonable unsecured creditor.
 The relative effectiveness of yet another possible rule should be
 compared: a rule recognizing unsecured creditors' property inter-
 ests in goods sold on credit to a debtor as paramount to secured
 creditors' property interests in after-acquired collateral. Many civil
 law countries recognize a vendor's lien as paramount to a compet-
 112 Cf. U.C.C. ? 2-309(3) (1990) ("Termination of a contract by one party except on the
 happening of an agreed event requires that reasonable notification be received by the
 other party and an agreement dispensing with notification is invalid if its operation would
 be unconscionable."); K.M.C. Co. v. Irving Trust Co., 757 F.2d 752, 759 (6th Cir. 1985)
 ("[T]he obligation [implied in every contract] to act in good faith. . . require[s] a period of
 notice to [the debtor] to allow it a reasonable opportunity to seek alternative financing,
 absent valid business reasons precluding [the secured party] from doing so."). Of course,
 even this reform would create uncertainty for lenders while courts resolve what period of
 notice is reasonable and what limitations should apply to the parties' ability to define
 reasonable notice in their contract. A better regulatory approach may be to establish a
 nonwaivable mandatory notice period.
 113 Courts generally hold that Article 2's doctrine of unconscionability is inapplicable to
 secured transactions. See, e.g., Tinsman v. Moline Beneficial Fin. Co., 531 F.2d 815, 818 n.5
 (7th Cir. 1976). Others have applied a common-law doctrine of unconscionability to
 financing arrangements. See, e.g., Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445,
 448-49 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
 114 See U.C.C. ? 2-302(1) (establishing that a "court as a matter of law [may find] the
 contract or any clause of the contract to be unconscionable") (emphasis added).
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 ing security interest."5 Louisiana did, too,"6 until 1988, the year it
 adopted Article 9 of the U.C.C.1"7 It ought to be possible to test
 empirically the relative efficiency of a supplier-first world as com-
 pared to an inventory-financer-first world by comparing lending
 practices in Louisiana before and after its enactment of Article 9.
 CONCLUSION
 LoPucki's reformulation of the unsecured creditor's bargain
 raises more questions than it resolves. By raising these questions,
 he provides us with a powerful counterclaim to the model of
 secured lending as a wealth-maximizing financial institution that
 benefits secured and unsecured creditors alike. By failing to
 resolve the nagging questions he poses, however, LoPucki is too
 quick to conclude that we would be better off without secured
 credit in its current form. Standing alone, his reformulation of the
 unsecured creditor's bargain is insufficient justification for drastic
 alterations to the law of secured transactions. LoPucki should jus-
 tify his proposed reforms as the most effective means of redressing
 the exploitation of involuntary and uninformed creditors, both as
 compared to alternative methods of reform and as relates to the
 contraction of secured credit sure to follow.
 115 See International Chamber Of Commerce, Retention Of Title (1989) (summarizing
 retention of title statutes of 19 countries).
 116 See La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 3227 (West 1994).
 117 See La. Rev. Stat. Ann. ? 10-9-101 (West 1993).
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